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Abstract
In its current form the Kyoto Protocol does not consider the issue of uncertainty in the
process of mutual recognition of emission reductions between Parties. We argue that a
lack of appropriate institutions that police emission reporting will lead to a
disintegration of the carbon market due to competition induced quality deterioriation of
reporting. The introduction of a verification clause in the Protocol’s rules would be a
first step towards avoiding disintegrative tendencies and carry the potential of
improving the Protocol’s effectiveness. Building on a physical approach of verification
times we derive an economic model of optimal emission and uncertainty reduction to
reach a verifiable emission target. In such a set-up, depending on its competitive
advantage, a Party can choose to reduce emissions and/or the associated uncertainties or
trade verified certificates. Thus, the proposed model is intended to help prioritize efforts
to reach verifiable emission reductions with least costs within a Kyoto type framework.
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1Avoiding a Lemons Market by Including
Uncertainty in the Kyoto Protocol:
Same Mechanism — Improved Rules
Michael Obersteiner, Yuri Ermoliev, Michael Gluck,
Matthias Jonas, Sten Nilsson and Anatoly Shvidenko
Introduction
Uncertainty in reporting carbon fluxes is an issue that has been largely ignored by the
architects of the Kyoto Protocol. For example, the most recent publication of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), “The Special Report on Land-use,
Land-use Change and Forestry (IPCC, 2000), considers a number of aspects dealing
with uncertainty but does not define uncertainty as such and falls short of considering
any operational rules managing uncertainty.1
The Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC, 1998) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC, 1992) contains the first legally binding commitments to limit or
reduce the emissions of six greenhouse gases. Net carbon emissions reported in support
of Kyoto commitments require verification, whether emission reduction measures have
been applied or not. The carbon accounts must be verifiable in a timely manner,
consistent with the commitment periods foreseen under the Protocol. From an economic
point of view the main problem associated with non-verifiability is that the carbon
market2 might collapse due to over-reporting races of non-verifiable emission reduction
claims. In this paper we provide an economic approach to solve this problem by
introducing uncertainty in the Kyoto mechanism without changing the basic structure of
the exisiting Protocol. We do so by including a verification clause into the rules of
mutual recognition of emission reduction. The approach is based on a physical
verification time concept developed by Jonas et al. (1999).
                                               
1
 Note: There are no widely accepted concepts of uncertainty. Formal methods describing the full range of
uncertainty have yet to be developed, which is the topic of a forthcoming paper (Obersteiner et al.,
2000b). In this paper uncertainty is used as a concept to describe the level of belief (of both buyers and
sellers) of the magnitude of deviation of reported emission reductions from the actual value.
2
 Here, the term market must be based in a wider definition. In our context, a market is already established
through mutual recognition of emission reduction and does not preclude the exchange of carbon credits.
Thus, the market is defined through the exchange of information.
2The Physical Basis
The results of Jonas et al. (1999), who studied the verifiability of carbon accounts under
the Kyoto Protocol by acknowledging the uncertainty underlying such accounts, provide
the basis for this study. The authors evaluated questions related to the methods used for
verifying carbon accounts and the effect of different provisions on the feasibility of
implementing the Protocol by developing and applying the concept of “verification
time”. This is the (minimal) time required to verify changes in carbon emissions. It links
the dynamics of carbon emissions with the dynamics of the underlying uncertainties.
Their findings of importance to this study are:
1. The three quantities determining the projected verification time of carbon emissions
are: today’s (mean) rate of change in carbon emissions, the associated uncertainty as
well as its rate of change.
This study translates this concept of verification time into economics by preserving
its physical basis.
2. Partial Carbon Accounting (PCA), restricted to CO2 emissions from fossil fuel
combustion and cement production, represents the only ‘clean’ scale-independent
carbon accounting approach that is characterized by verification times compatible
with the Kyoto Protocol. In the event that the Kyoto Protocol is based on PCA under
partial inclusion of biological sources and sinks, caveats are introduced that are
related to the mismatch of verification conditions from one country to another and to
severe impediments to Full Carbon Accounting (FCA) on large spatial scales.
This study presupposes that these adverse concomitants are negated and that the
Kyoto Protocol will be realized without fundamental changes and continue to
include part of the biological sources and sinks.
3. Reaching agreed Kyoto targets will primarily be a question of how much countries
will be able to reduce their carbon emissions. Reducing associated uncertainties will
play a non-negligible, nevertheless second-order role, particularly in the medium- to
long-term.
,QWKLVVXG\WZRRIWKHWKUHHSK\VLFDOTXDQWLWLHVPHQWLRQHGDERYH WKHUDWHRIFKDQJH
LQFDUERQHPLVVLRQVDQGWKHUDWHRIFKDQJHLQWKHXQFHUWDLQW\ DUHWUHDWHGDVHFRQRPLF
decision variables.
The Importance of Verifiability
The Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC, 1998) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC, 1992) contains the first legally binding commitments to reduce
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The introduction of legally binding commitments for
carbon reduction in the Kyoto Protocol lead to methodological questions of verifying
compliance with emission targets. Verification requires that binding commitments are
not only a function of the rates of net emission changes, but also of the associated
uncertainties and their rates of change (Jonas et al., 1999).
The economics profession has a long tradition of theory building on how an ideal
market should look, but economic theory provides little guidance on how to establish a
market. North (1997) has suggested four institutional features that are associated with
3low-cost transaction and credible commitment, essential for the functioning of any
market:
• The cost of measuring;
• The size of the market;
• Enforcement of rules; and
• Attitudes and perceptions.
With respect to the topic of our paper the first and the third features are of special
interest. The first feature, the cost of measuring, deals with the fact that when no or poor
standards exist with regard to the quality of goods and services, the behavior of agents,
etc., every single transaction might be the subject of endless deliberations.
The third feature is the enforcement of rules. When parties dispute or break the rules
(e.g., over-report) they should have recourses for cheap ways of solving their
differences. This is mainly done by third party solutions. It should, however, be
mentioned that the cheapest enforcement occurs when people have internalized certain
conducts of behavior as norms.
In the following section we will briefly discuss three arguments that support the idea
that at least the efficiency or even the integrity of the market is in danger if there is an
institutional vacuum concerning features one and three.
The lemons argument.  Verifiability will become a necessary condition for mutual
recognition of claimed emission reductions and, thus, become also a necessary
precondition for emissions trading and other flexible instruments irrespective of its
domestic or international implementation. Based on Ackerlof’s lemons market concept,
we conclude that for any carbon market arrangement rational actors would want to
abstain from a set of commitments, if there is larger latitude of conscious biases in the
underlying reporting for the other participants in the market. Unless there is a
sufficiently large penalty for at least conscious biases, a successful implementation of
the Kyoto Protocol does not seem likely to occur. If other parties prior to trading or
recognition cannot observe reporting quality, then the reporting party will be tempted to
skimp on it. Other parties will become reluctant to pay relatively higher prices under the
instruments contained in the Protocol or will be reluctant to recognize reporting as they
learn to expect over-reported emission reductions — or ‘lemons’ (see Ackerlof, 1970).
The winner-loser gap argument.  The lemons argument only applies if in the end buyers
care about the quality of the product provided, i.e., in the case of carbon markets the real
(verifiable) carbon emission reduction. This does not necessarily need to be applicable
to all participants of the Kyoto market. Participants might only care about fulfilling their
legal commitments once they are agreed upon and will not worry about their true carbon
balance. In this case, some parties would be clearly better off if they over-report.
However, as we will show, if the parties are different in their ability to over-report
disintegrative tendencies will prevail in most cases. To demonstrate this point let us
consider a number of market constellations between buyers and sellers in a game
theoretic setting.3 For simplicity, assume that both buyers and sellers can consist of
                                               
3
 For illustrative purposes we take on the analogy of a price forming market of buyers and sellers.
However, the intuition gained from the example should be directly transferable to the non-price forming
mechanism of mutual recognition of emission reduction.
4countries that can over-report (H) and countries that report the true value or even under-
report (L). In Figures 1 and 2 the hypothetical pay-offs for the buyer (first number in
each cell) and the seller (second number in each cell) relative to a market that requires
verification (L-L) are listed.4 Figures 1 and 2 show the hypothetical pay-offs of a price
elastic and a price inelastic market mimicking the market models proposed by the
JUSCANNZ5 alliance and the EU. JUSCANNZ, which is lead by the US, favor a target
based on all greenhouse gases, sources and sinks, flexibility, and meaningful
participation of key developing countries (Ramos-Martin, 2000). The European Union
on the other hand is defending the “common but differentiated responsibility principle”
and envisions a less flexible market mechanism with country specific quota of trade of
HPLVVLRQULJKWV DPRUHSULFHLQHODVWLFPDUNHW
Seller Seller
H L H L
Buyer H + +, – – + + +, – – Buyer H + +, – + + +, – –
L +, + + 0,0 L +, – 0,0
Figure 1: Price elastic markets. Figure 2: Price inelastic markets.
Case I (L–L case):
All countries are virtually not able to over-report emission reduction (L–L case). Such a
market constellation would correspond to the benchmark market of verifiable carbon
accounts. The pay-off from introducing verification would be (0,0).
Case II (H–H case):
If all countries are able to over-report equally high (H–H) then buyers would gain by
decreasing their demand for emission certificates and, in addition, in the price elastic
case from lower prices. Sellers, in turn, would lose due to erroding demand and falling
prices because of over-supply in the price elastic case.
Case III (L–H case):
If the group of buyers is mainly dominated by L-types and sellers are mainly H-types,
buyers would improve their situation and sellers would either gain or lose depending on
the elasticity of demand. If demand is fully elastic (Figure 1) then sellers would be able
to sell more carbon credits (some of which will have been produced with zero costs, i.e.,
over-reported), but at a lower price. Here, we assume that sellers would in total improve
their situation because the price effect is over-ruled by the quantity effects. This might,
however, not become true depending on the supply/demand quantities. In the case of
inelastic demand (Figure 2) sellers would lose, because over-reporting races would lead
to falling prices which can not be compensated by quantity responses in a price inelastic
market. The pay-off to the buyers would be smaller in the inelastic case compared to the
                                               
4
 A more formal analysis on disequilibrium forces in this context will be provided in a forthcoming paper.
Such an analysis would go beyond the scope of this paper, which focuses on ways to incorporate a
verifiability clause in a Kyoto market.
5
 Japan, USA, Canada, New Zealand.
5elastic case due to the fact that countries would not benefit from the ‘artificially’ lower
costs of traded carbon by the substitution of domestic emission reduction.
Case IV (H–L case):
In the case that buyers are able to exploit high uncertainties, buyers will have to perform
fewer domestic actions and will also need to purchase less carbon credits from abroad.
Under both elastic and inelastic market conditions sellers will lose due to a shrinking
market in terms of quantity and falling prices.
The altruist – defector argument. A market failure based on the lemons and the winner-
loser-gap argument require direct observation or direct reciprocity. In an anonymous
market, as is partially planned to be organized for the trade of emission permits, a more
indirect mechanism is in action. As we will elaborate in the following paragraphs, even
under conditions of indirect reciprocity the market might become biased towards
defectors (countries which over-report), which could lead to market failure. In order to
support this argument we take up the concept developed by Nowak and Sigmund
(1998). In their model, each player has two interactions per round, one as a donor and
one as a recipient. The same individuals are never paired twice and direct reciprocation
is thus impossible. Such a game theoretical set up comes somewhat closer to the market
conditions of a semi-anonymous market as we envisage the Kyoto market. Depending
on the strategies they use, the players can fall into one of three categories (see Figure 3):
uncertainty ignorers (indiscriminate altruists), who always accept the official emission
reports of other countries; over-reporters (defectors), who always try to over-report; and
uncertainty managers (discriminate altruists), who accept the official emission reports if
the potential trading partner did not over-report in the last round. Suppose now that the
carbon market consists entirely of countries that always accept whatever the other
countries report. If the state of altruists is above the lightning bolt some over-reporters
will take over. If it is below the sun symbol, defectors (over-reporters) will immediately
be selected against and will promptly vanish. But, if a minority of defectors appears
while the state is between the lightning bolt and the sun, then defectors will at first
H[SORLW WKH LQGLVFULPLQDWH DOWUXLVWV DQG LQFUHDVH LQ IUHTXHQF\  WKHUHE\ OHDGLQJ WR D
potential market failure in our terminology used above due to large over-supplies of
carbon credits. If there is no immediate restructuring of the institutions governing the
market (i.e., a decent uncertainty management) only the discriminate altruists will
eventually take over and eliminate the over-reporters. Now, the frequency of
discriminate altruists will be below the sun.
6Figure 3: Market Trajectories Under Indirect Reciprocity of Uncertainty Ignorers,
Uncertainty Managers and Over-reporters (Source: Adapted from Options,
Spring 2000).
It follows that an appropriate institutional solution should be developed prior to
evolutionary learning which in itself is a very costly process and discrimination will
also come at economic cost if the norms are not fully internalized.
From this exercise, we can conclude that the market is most likely to disintegrate if
market participants become aware of possible over-reporting, regardless of their
aspiration to reduce real carbon emissions. The virulence of the disintegrative forces
will depend on the magnitudes of over-reported carbon emissions on both the buyers
and sellers side, the distribution of market power between losers and winners, the
location(s) where the game is played in the above stated matrices, and the relative
difference in the pay-offs. In any case, there will always be winners and losers as soon
as parties differ in their ability to over-report on their real emissions and dissatisfaction
will rise with the size of the pay-off gap between (and even among) buyers and sellers.
From experimental economics, for example, ultimatum games (Fehr and Gächter,
1997), we know that even in situations where both seller and buyer win (e.g., L-H in the
price elastic case) but the difference between the two market participants is too large,
the market will disintegrate.
Another side effect of lacking institutions policing emissions reporting is that countries
with weak institutions that monitor carbon emissions will push carbon intensive
production into the shadow economy or will at least set incentives to protect
undiscovered sources. In this sense, it is not clear whether the current Protocol may set
incentives or, worse yet, subsidize the creation of black markets.
Uncertainty Ignorers
Over-reportersUncertainty Managers
7We argue that for policy makers concerned with the Kyoto Protocol the lemons market
phenomenon will become a pressing issue under the realization of the Protocol. In
addition, there are also other dimensions to the verifiability concept. The uncertainty
concept envisaged by the IPCC (1999) fails to identify adverse compensatory effects
that could neutralize or even overrule well-intended Kyoto measures due to negative
feedback mechanisms. Negative feedbacks or leakage arise from adverse spatial and
temporal spillover effects and should be subtracted from the reported emission
reduction or added to the uncertainty.
Bearing in mind that there are budget constraints for Kyoto measures, we must
increasingly acknowledge the importance of the effectiveness of Kyoto measures.
Effectiveness could be hampered, in a least cost sense of total net emission reduction, if
the full range of carbon reduction measures and the range of GHG is restricted. There is
a danger for the post-Kyoto process that certain measures are a priori disqualified on
the grounds of the large uncertainty they carry.  However, research by Jonas et al.
(1999) indicates that technospheric systems should be separated from biospheric
systems.  This is based on an analysis of verification times, which shows that only
technospheric measures will be verifiable within the Kyoto period. In this paper,
however, we argue that uncertainty can be priced and in this way be included in a
trading scheme.  Within such a trade mechanism of verifiable carbon accounts,
biospheric measures could turn out to be cost competitive despite large uncertainties in
the biosphere. However, the problem of differential systems dynamics remains.  This
problem can probably be solved by the formation of common carbon markets as
illustrated in Obersteiner et al. (2000a). Following the above mentioned arguments
could lead to a situation where uncertainty and knowledge gaps could mean foregone
options of reduction or mitigation strategies.
The three arguments can be summarized in the following question: “Who is willing to
participate in a Clean Development Act or Joint Implementation Program?” if
participating parties:
(1) are unable to verify emission reduction within a short commitment period.
(2) give biased reports leading to a disintegration of the market.
(3) take the risk of implementing actions that are, at best, inefficient or ineffective due
to knowledge gaps in finding the minimum cost instruments to combat global
warming.
Much remains to be done in order to answer all of these questions. The introduction of a
verifiability concept would be a first major step in solving some of these problems. It is,
thus, the purpose of this paper to design a model that helps to prioritize efforts to reach
verifiable emission reductions with least costs within a Kyoto type framework, and
carries the prospect of taking these forward in a post-Kyoto process. The model
developed below is equally applicable to project, regional, national, and global levels of
emission reduction. The quantification of uncertainties, however, is strictly level
specific.  The economic solution to the verifiability problem is achieved by attaching an
economic cost to uncertainty.  In the following description we develop a model that
provides a decision maker with an optimal decision rule on emission and uncertainty
reductions in a Kyoto market that requires verifiable carbon accounts.
8The Model
In the following paragraphs we develop a model that allows us to compute the optimal
choice of emission reduction and uncertainty reduction within a Kyoto type framework.
Consider a Kyoto world where a country has to choose its path of emission reduction to
meet an agreed emission target (Kt) (see Figure 4 for the increasing emissions case). In
order to meet its commitment the country must choose a certain rate of emission
reduction, 
dt
dF
, for each time period t.6 Emission reduction involves a cost cF  to finance
projects that reduce carbon emissions or induce increased carbon sequestration.
Likewise, regulations, fees and carbon taxes that are targeted to decrease GHG
emissions come at economic cost.7 If the measures taken are not sufficient or if the cost
of emission reduction in the country is too large, countries are allowed to reach the
Kyoto target by carbon trading or other flexible arrangements. On the other hand,
countries that shoot over the Kyoto target are allowed to sell their surplus on the carbon
market or, if allowed, bank it for use in subsequent periods.
Figure 4: Simplified linear graphical representation of the key variables concerned.
Illustration for increasing net carbon emissions (Ft < Ft+1 ) and decreasing in
their uncertainty (εt > εt+1) (Source: Adapted from Jonas et al., 1999).
In principle there are two ways of dealing with uncertainties. First, countries could be
penalized for uncertainties and second, countries are allowed to reduce this penalty by
reducing the level of uncertainty.8 Both options are expressed as variables in the model
set-up. Assume that a country starts with an initial degree of uncertainty
( )−+ −=ε=ε
111 ttt
FF
2
1
2
1
 in t1=1990. Uncertainties can be changed at a rate of
                                               
6
 For a list of the variables and units, see Appendix 1.
7
 It is, of course, possible that energy cost savings and innovation triggered economic growth create
positive externalities that compensate for such costs.
8
 An analogy can be found in, e.g., life insurance markets. A reduced rate is offered after medical
examination otherwise a flat rate is given.
F
net [GtC yr-1]
t [yr]t1               t2
+F
−F
1t
ε
Kt
t
dt
dF
t
net ∆
1
912
tt
ttdt
d 12
−
ε−ε
=
ε
 through measures reaching from improved statistical reporting of
apparent consumption data of fossil fuels, detailed measurements of fugitive emissions,
and more frequent and detailed assessments of conversion factors to improved
inventories of LUF measures.9 If uncertainties cannot be reduced, the country will be
penalized for the remaining uncertainty.
A model needs to be constructed that provides a decision rule for a specific country to
optimally reduce emissions and/or reduce uncertainties. To solve this problem we
formulate a profit maximization (loss minimization) for the commitment period. Profits
are maximized by optimally choosing carbon emission changes
( t
t
F
t
t
FF ∆
∂
∂

 ∆
∂
∂
−=∆ sgn ) and change of uncertainties )sgn( t
t
t
t
∆
∂
∂

 ∆
∂
∂
−=∆ εεε
over this one period yrst 20=∆ .10 In the aggregate in order to achieve market clearing
revenues must balance costs. Revenues, within a Kyoto framework, are calculated by
the (discounted11) value of total reported emission reductions corrected for uncertainties
in 2010 (which is the uncertainty in 1990 )(ε  minus its change over the 20-year
period12,13). Total revenue is positive if emission reduction is verifiable and the emission
target was reached, and negative if emission reduction is not verifiable and/or the
emission target was not reached. The price p is assumed to be the aggregate solution of
the respective competitive carbon market given that emissions are verifiable. Two types
of costs arise if the country decides to take its own steps to actively reduce carbon
emissions:
(1) Total cost of emission reduction, which is equal to the total amount of carbon
reduced over the commitment period multiplied by the specific average cost Fc .
The specific average cost is a function of F and F∆  and this cost function should
exhibit the usual properties needed for microeconomic analyses (e.g., Varian,
1992). On a country level this cost function not only includes technological
variables but also factors such as population and economic growth; and
(2) The total cost of uncertainty reduction is equal to the total amount of uncertainty
reduced over the commitment period multiplied by the specific average cost εc .
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 Applicable concepts to quantify uncertainties have yet to be scientifically worked out.
10
 The model set up is general enough so that F∆ can take on the definition of the necessary rate of
emission reduction to reach the Kyoto target in 2010 or any other emission reduction target under a
different convention also taking into account the polluter pays principle and the principle of equity.
11
 For simplicity we ignore a discount rate for this period. In addition, there are methodological issues to
be solved by applying a discount rate if the quality of rewards is not fully understood. A multiperiod
model involving a discount rate will be developed in a follow-up paper to analyze optimal behavior under
Kyoto and post-Kyoto scenarios.
12
 Other verification concepts and various notions of uncertainty (see Obersteiner et al., 2000a,b) are
possible by changing the nature of ε∆ .
13
 Note:  From a methodological point of view it is interesting to observe that we can derive the
verification time formula of Jonas et al. (1999) from the revenue function:
t
dt
d
dt
dF
0t
dt
d
t
dt
dF ∆=
ε
−
ε
⇔=

 ∆ε−ε−∆ .
10
εc  is a function of ε and ε∆  and is assumed to exhibit the required properties in
microeconomic analyses.
The task is to maximize the following goal function with respect to the two choice
variables ε∆∆ andF :
( ) ( ) ( )
( ))(FKt
.t.s
cFcp)(Fmax F
,,F
ε∆−ε−∆≤
∆−∆−ε∆−ε−∆=pi εελε∆∆
This maximization problem can be used to analyze the optimal solution for an
individual country or even an individual project as well as for an ensemble of countries
participating in the carbon market. The optimization problem needs to be constrained by
the emission reduction target (Kt). It is demanded that the collection of countries (over-)
fulfill their joint commitment target.
Setting up the Lagrangian,
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }ε∆+ε−∆−λ−ε∆−∆−ε∆+ε−∆=pi ελε∆∆ FKtcFcpFmax F,,F (1)
In order to find the maximum we need to calculate the first order conditions (FOC):14
{ } 0)()( =++′∆−=∆∂
∂ λpi FF ccFpF (2)
{ } 0)()( =++′∆−=∆∂
∂ λε
ε
pi
εε ccp (3)
{ } 0FKt)( =ε∆+ε−∆+−=λ∂
pi∂ (4)
From equations (2) 0)F( =∆∂
pi∂
 and (3) 0)( =ε∆∂
pi∂
 we find
F
F
c
ccc
F
′
−+′∆
=∆ εεε )( (5)
and
ε
εε
c
cccF FF
′
−+′∆
=∆ )( (6)
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 Notational simplification: We define F
F c
F
c
′=
∆∂
∂
 and ε
ε
ε
c
c
′=
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∂
.
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respectively. Inserting equation (6) into equation (4) yields the expression for the
optimal F∆ ;
{ }
F
F
F
*
cc
ccKt
cc
cF
′+′
−
+ε+
′+′
′
=∆
ε
ε
ε
ε (7)
or when inserting equation (5) into equation (4) get the corresponding expression for the
optimal ε∆ ;
{ }
F
F
F
F*
cc
ccKt
cc
c
′+′
−
+ε+
′+′
′
=ε∆
ε
ε
ε
. (8)
Equation (7) shows the optimal decision rule for );,,,,(** KtccccFF FF εεε ′′∆=∆ . *F∆
is a function of the initial uncertainty, the average cost and the marginal average cost of
emission and uncertainty reductions, and the emission reduction target. Likewise,
equation (8) shows the optimal decision rules of uncertainty reduction
);,,,,(** Ktcccc FF ′′∆=∆ εεεεε . *ε∆  is a function of the initial uncertainty, the average
cost and the marginal average cost of uncertainty and emission reductions, and the
emission reduction target. Equations (7) and (8) give the expression for the optimal
emission/uncertainty reduction. Given the optimal decision rules and necessary
parameters like the Kyoto target, the cost schedule for abatement strategies and sink
enhancement measures, the initial level of uncertainty of the relevant carbon system as
well as the cost schedule for uncertainty reduction a country can specify its optimal
Kyoto policy. All of the variables entering the decision rules are ex ante quantifiable.
Discussion
So far, the uncertainty discussion of economists has centered on the uncertainty of the
effects of climatic change per se. On these lines, Bretteville (1999) and van Kooten et
al. (1997) have shown that the uncertainty of climate change (cooling — neutral-
warming) delays actions, since there is nobody willing to carry the cost of the risk
premium of a climate action policy if there is a sufficiently large probability that carbon
emissions do not change the world’s climate. However, these types of uncertainties are
eliminated by the precautionary principle, which is already clearly embedded in the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change agreed on at the Earth Summit in 1992.
In this paper we are, however, more interested in the role of uncertainties related to
carbon accounting within the Kyoto framework, which demands a different type of
analysis. This type of uncertainty is related to issues of verifying emission reductions.
We argue that a transparent system of legally binding emission reduction commitments
is a necessary precondition for the functioning of any such mechanism design. In the
absence of full transparency and built-in verification mechanisms carbon markets can be
expected to turn into a lemons market, where over-reporting races of unverifiable
emission reductions will lead, at least, to a very inefficient carbon market killing the
momentum for an improved post-Kyoto process. Verification has proved to be an
indispensable tool for many other international agreements like issues of disarmament.
Transparency and verification can only be achieved if uncertainties of the reported
emission reductions are quantified and if these uncertainties are taken into account in
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the process of the mutual recognition of emission reductions and in the system of
emission trading. If we are unable to include uncertainties in this mechanism, Kyoto
might only prove to be an interesting socioeconomic experiment. However, in its core
business of contributing to solving the climate problem, it will have limited success and
the parties will necessarily lose their commitment for continuation in a post-Kyoto
process. It is, thus, indispensable to include uncertainties in the Kyoto Protocol and that
appropriate institutions are created that are able to police the reported carbon accounts.
The purpose of this paper was to develop a simple model that could serve as a
theoretical basis for an improved Kyoto mechanism by allowing for uncertainties
without changing the basic structure of the Protocol. Introducing uncertainties reveals
two advantages: (1) avoidance of sub-optimal solutions with regard to a minimum cost
criterium to reduce atmospheric carbon, and (2) verifiability of emission reductions. It
was also a requirement that the model should continue the analytical rigor of the
analysis of the physical system and its interpretation of uncertainties (Jonas et al.,
1999). In addition, this paper endeavors to build on much of the political achievements
of the Kyoto process and in its basic structure it is general enough to be applied for
post-Kyoto cases.
In this paper we deducted a simple optimal decision rule for agents in the Kyoto market
of mutually recognized legally binding emission reductions and tradable emission
certificates by including uncertainties. Assessment and recognition of uncertainties
become an integral part of the rules governing the market. Uncertainties need to be
included in such a mechanism in order to eliminate adverse effects of a lemons market.
Under such modified rules the optimal strategy of emission reductions to meet a (post-)
Kyoto target is a function of initial uncertainties, the emission reduction target itself
(Kt), the cost and marginal cost of emission reduction, and the cost and marginal cost of
uncertainty reduction. If a country decides to take only its own (domestic and joint
implementation) actions to reach the Kyoto target, it is the relative cost advantage of
uncertainty reduction versus the cost of emission reduction that mainly rule the
decisions. If the specific cost for emission reduction is larger than the specific cost for
reducing uncertainty, then it is better to start with uncertainty reduction until the cost for
uncertainty reduction becomes larger than that for emission reduction. It should be
noted, however, that at least in the long-run, emission reduction will be the prime
decision variable. If a country decides to also participate in a carbon market, it is the
cost competitiveness of emission and uncertainty reductions versus the revenue from
carbon trading of verified certificates that drives the decision processes. Carbon trading
can generate additional income if the country’s own actions are cheaper than that of the
average market or can help to avoid cost explosion from domestic actions due to large
uncertainties and high abatement costs.
There is also a need to look beyond the simplified assumptions in the model. One
interesting example is the assumption of independence of the uncertainty reduction and
the costs of emission reduction. It is most likely to assume that uncertainty reduction
increases the knowledge of the carbon system, which improves the chances to find the
least cost strategies for emission reduction.
The second important issue is that the decrease of uncertainties is an adaptive process,
which can for instance be implemented at the project level with permanent monitoring
and the use of complementary methods.
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The third issue relates to the fact that uncertainty is usually defined in probabilistic
terms. Such questions as the appropriate confidence limits still need to be considered in
greater detail.
The fourth issue is that we face a dynamic system where the state variables used in the
optimization problem are time dependent.  In Appendix 2 we provide an analysis of the
dynamic description of the problem.
All variables governing the optimal decision rule are in principle quantifiable at the
beginning of the commitment period. Estimates of cost schedules for fossil fuel
reduction measures have already been worked out. However, estimates on specific costs
of uncertainty reduction have still not been examined. In the model presented above, we
did not distinguish between random and systematic errors and, for simplicity, we
attached a uniform cost to the lump-sum uncertainty. The cost of those two errors are by
nature inherently different. Let us illustrate this point with a simple example referring to
the sink strength of Russian forests, which under FCA could become a significant
carbon player. Over the past 35 years the mean yearly sink is approximately 240 TgC
(yr-1) (fossil fuel emissions: 650 TgC (yr-1)). If we assume that a unit of carbon is worth
10$ (Sohngen and Mendelsohn, 1999) a 2.4 billion $ carbon credit can be attributed to
the sink strength of Russian forests.15 Increasing the precision estimates of the sink
strength would mainly be achieved through a denser inventory net, which will require
funds in the one digit million $ dimension.
With respect to a more comprehensive analysis of NPP, NEP and NBP involving
remote sensing similar to the Canadian BEPS, which also involves the elimination of a
number of biases, would cost around 5 million CDN $ (Chen, 2000). From these
numbers we can conclude that for at least Russia the relative costs of reducing
uncertainties of biospheric actions on large scales are probably very small compared to
the abatement costs of fossil fuel actions and the cost of biospheric actions such as
reforestation and afforestation, where we face the problem of spatial spillovers. With
respect to the reduction of uncertainties of fossil fuel emissions similar relations can be
expected, however, with a different parameterization of the cost function bearing in
mind that cε is a function of ε and ε∆ .
Finally, it should be mentioned that not only the carbon community draws benefits from
instruments that reduce uncertainties but forest fire detection systems, precision
farming, improved industry and macroeconomic statistics for investors would also
largely benefit from improved understanding and monitoring of the carbon system.
Thus, co-financing schemes for monitoring systems of carbon fluxes within an
integrated country information system could be a viable way to further reduce the costs
of uncertainty reduction.
Uncertainty reduction involves significant increasing returns to scale, large sunk costs
and probably long amortization periods. Due to the increasing return property, but also
for credibility reasons, the grand part of the uncertainty issue should be tackled by
international networking efforts rather than on an individual project or country level.
Although we face the problem that the international community has closer access to
sovereign information it can be expected that the positive externalities outweigh this
                                               
15
 Note that the abatement costs in the energy and industry sectors are much higher than those for
maintaining sink strength.
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disadvantage. More collaboration across national boundaries, improved knowledge and
certainty of the global carbon cycle will help to maintain the momentum of the Kyoto
process.
Concluding Remarks
The main thesis that prompted us to write this paper was that verifiability of carbon
accounts will eventually become a necessary condition for the mutual recognition of
legally binding commitments and for carbon trading. Verifiability has proved to be an
indispensable part of many other international agreements mainly related to
disarmament. Without proper procedures and institutional embedding of verification
and sufficient penalization for uncertainty, over-reporting of claimed emission reduction
will lead to the disintegration of the carbon market. We provide a first step towards
verifiability by developing a carbon trade model under which uncertainty is included. In
this model a country can choose to reduce emissions and/or reduce uncertainties to
reach the verifiable emission reduction target at least cost. In the model, over-reporting
comes at the cost of creating incentives to trim the uncertainty band of reporting. A
shrinking uncertainty band reduces the range of possible emission reporting.
The policy recommendation is now rather conclusive.  It is a must that emission
reductions have to be mutually recognized and accepted as “true” emission reductions
by all participating parties.  This can only be guaranteed if emission reductions and
uncertainty ranges are certified by an independent neutral third party.  Only emission
reductions that can be verified should be acknowledged to be “true”.  However, Jonas et
al. (1999) show that some emission reductions can not favorably be verified within the
20 year time frame of the Kyoto mechanism.  Thus, a trading scheme that penalizes
uncertainties will make unfavorably verifiable emission reductions manageable from an
economic point of view in the process of mutual recognition. Such uncertainty
management will provide an incentive to reduce the uncertainty band, which will help to
make carbon accounts physically verifiable in a shorter time span.
From a methodological point of view it is interesting to observe that the physical
verification time concept can be independently derived from an economic formulation
of the problem.
Verification is strongly linked to the properties of the types of errors a system exhibits.
There is large latitude for conscious and unconscious biases in reporting depending on
how uncertainty itself and the system boundaries of the carbon system are defined.
Thus, depending on the type of carbon accounting and uncertainty definition, we are
currently developing concepts of weak and strong verification. Strong verification
comes under a full carbon accounting system. FCA has the advantage that the
probability for biases is reduced, which under PCA may have been ignored. FCA,
however, carries the disadvantage that the estimates of FCA fluxes show higher random
errors (lower precision) than those under PCA. This is due to the fact that PCA is a sub-
system of the largest possible carbon system — FCA (for a further discussion on this
issue see Obersteiner et al., 2000b).
Another problem that can be solved by including uncertainty in a (post-) Kyoto Protocol
is that components of the carbon system can a priori not be disqualified on the grounds
of the high uncertainty they are bearing. This especially applies to land-use change and
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other biospheric measures, which are to some extent still poorly understood and are still
associated with large uncertainties. This is, among others, one reason why a post-Kyoto
process may be restrictive to include biological sources and sinks as well as a wide
range of different GHGs.  Nonetheless, it should be acknowledged that emissions from
the destruction of vegetation make up about one third of the total anthropogenic carbon
emissions and that CO2-C is only half of the GHG story. Thus, if the uncertainty
question can be solved we might be able to include more effective measures in carbon
reduction mechanisms. This would not only lead to a more comprehensive approach to
the climate change problem, but would also help to prioritize efforts to reach verifiable
emission reduction involving smaller costs with respect to the ultimate goal of slowing
global warming.  We should mention, however, that the problem of drastically different
systems dynamics between biospheric and technospheric systems remains.  Obersteiner
et al. (2000a) propose a solution to this problem by suggesting the formation of
common carbon markets.
Finally, we would like to note that the model presented in this paper is general enough
to be applicable to many other mechanism designs outside the Kyoto world involving
verification and active uncertainty reduction.
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Appendix 1: List of Variables and Units
1)20( −∆ yrTgCFK .
1)( −yrTgCKε .
1)( −∆ yrTgCKε .
Kp monetary unit (mU) to be paid per TgC.
1
F )TgC(mUc −K .
1)TgC(mUc −εK .
1)( −yrTgCKtK .
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Appendix 2: Dynamic Description of the Problem
Reaching the target means that a country must choose a certain schedule (path) of
emission reduction tF∆  and uncertainty reduction tε∆  for each time period t =
1,2,…,N.  The reduction means that a country incurs a cost )F,t(c t∆ , ),t(d tε∆ .  The
problem to be solved is now to minimize
0,0F
KtF
.t.s
),t(d)F,t(c
tt
N
N
1t t
N
1t t
N
1t t
N
1t t
≥ε∆≥∆
≥ε∆+ε−∆
ε∆+∆
∑∑
∑∑
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where KtN is the Kyoto target.  Setting up the Lagrangian with 0≥λ ,
We find that the optimal values opttF∆ , 
opt
tε∆  satisfy equations
N,...,2,1t,)F,t(c t’ Ft =λ=∆∆
N,...,2,1t,),t(c t’ t =λ=ε∆ε∆
Assume that cost functions )F(c)F,t(c tt ∆=∆ , )(d),t(d tt ε∆=ε∆ .  Then from the FOCs
it follows that
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N
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2
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1
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N
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2
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1
ε∆==ε∆=ε∆
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Therefore, the optimal path requires the same rates at each t = 1,2,…,N.
The problem in this case is formulated as follows, we minimize
.0,0F
KtNFN
.t.s
)(Nd)F(Nc
N
≥ε∆≥∆
≥ε∆+ε−∆
ε∆+∆
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The optimal levels optF∆ , optε∆  satisfy
Instead of the cost functions )F(c)F,t(c tt ∆=∆ , )(d),t(d tt ε∆=ε∆  it is possible to
consider the costs in the form F)F(a)F(c ∆∆=∆ , ε∆ε∆=ε∆ )(b)(d :
.)(b)(’b
)F(aF)F(’a
λ=ε∆+ε∆ε∆
λ=∆+∆∆
λ=∆∆ )F(c’ F
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